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Electronic Discovery
by K. Alex Khoury*
At the end of 2015, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended
to reform the discovery process with three main goals in mind: (1) promoting cooperation between the parties, (2) emphasizing proportionality
in discovery, and (3) encouraging active case management by the courts.
This Article will examine how the courts in the Eleventh Circuit interpreted and applied the new rules in 2016 and consider whether the new
rules are having their desired effect on E-Discovery practice.'
I. COOPERATION
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 was amended to promote cooperation by expressly stating that "the parties" are responsible for employing
the Rules to obtain just, speedy, and inexpensive results in litigation. 3
Although the amendment did not create any new obligations on the parties, it was intended to encourage the parties to cooperate in furtherance
of the goals of Rule 1. Attorneys versed in E-Discovery can attest to the
tremendous savings in time and expense possible through cooperation,
but if you asked ten attorneys to define "cooperation" in the context of EDiscovery, you would likely get ten different definitions. Rule 1 and its
accompanying committee notes offer no guidance on how the parties are
to cooperate.
The contours of E-Discovery cooperation may have been outlined by
Chief Justice John Roberts in his 2015 Year-End Report on the Federal
Judiciarywhen he wrote, 'The test for plaintiffs' and defendants' counsel
alike is whether they will affirmatively search out cooperative solutions,
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3. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1 advisory committee's note to 2015 amendment.
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chart a cost-effective course of litigation, and assume shared responsibility with opposing counsel to achieve just results." 4 In 2016, federal courts
began filling in details around Justice Roberts's outline, including several
district courts in the Eleventh Circuit.
The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida invoked Rule 1's implicit call for cooperation in Lanard Toys Ltd. v. Dolgencorp, LLC,5 stating:

Foremost, Rule 1 provides that the rules "should be construed, administered, and employed by the court and the parties to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding." The recent addition of "and the parties" places shared "responsibility to employ the rules in the same way." "Effective advocacy is consistent with-and indeed depends upon-cooperative and proportional
use of procedure."6
The E-Discovery dispute in Lanard Toys arose, at least in part, because the parties failed to address E-Discovery concerns adequately in
their Rule 26(f) 7 discovery plan. The parties' "plan" for discovery of electronically stored information (ESI) was to "work together in good faith to
try to agree to a stipulated agreement regarding the disclosure and discovery of [ESI]."8 The court aptly described the parties' agreement to
agree as "too simplistic and too optimistic." 9
Predictably, no agreement was reached before the parties began discovery. In response to the plaintiffs discovery requests, the defendant
collected and produced documents in the manner and format of its choosing without metadata.1 0 The plaintiff sought broader discovery, including
the discovery of metadata, and moved the court to compel the defendant

4. JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., 2015 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 11
(2015), reprinted in STATE OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE CHIEF
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (Shelley L. Dowling ed., 2016)

[hereinafter ANNUAL REPORTS], availableat http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/yearend/2015year-endreport.pdf.
5. No. 3:15-cv-849-J-34PDB, 2016 WL 7031326 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 21, 2016).
6. Id. at *1 (quoting FED. R. CIv. P. 1; FED. R. CIv. P. 1 advisory committee's note to
2015 amendment).
7. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(f).
8. Lanard Toys, 2016 WL 7031326, at *4.
9. Id.
10. See id.; see also Defendants-Counterclaimants' Response in Opposition to PlaintiffCounterdefendant's Motion to Compel Agreement Facilitating the Production of Electronically Stored Information, Lanyard Toys Ltd. v. Dolgencorp, LLC, No. 3:15-CV-849-34PDB,
2016 WL 7031326 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 21, 2016) (No. 3:15-CV-00849-MMH-PDB), 2016 WL
686687.
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to agree to an ESI discovery plan or have plaintiffs proposed plan imposed on it." The court denied the plaintiffs motion. One fact the court
weighed in the defendant's favor was its offer to produce the metadata
for any document it had already produced "upon the plaintiffs request
and explanation for need."1 2 The court's reasoning and ruling is an endorsement of Rule 1's call for a "cooperative and proportional use of procedure." 13
Blake v. Batmasianl4 was a Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)1 case
that was derailed in discovery by the parties' and their counsels' "obvious
mutual animus," which, the court noted, had "made the discovery process
unnecessarily combative, excessively litigious, and wasteful of the
Court's limited judicial resources."' 6 After having already conducted
three 'lengthy discovery hearings" in the case, the court was forced to
referee a dispute over the plaintiffs attempt to depose witnesses about
alleged scandalous conduct by one of the defendants-allegations the
court had already struck from the complaint as irrelevant to the case.17
The court denied the plaintiffs request for additional time to depose witnesses on topics immaterial to the FLSA claim, citing, among other
things, Rule 26'sS proportionality requirement.' 9 The court also emphasized cooperation, reminding the parties that Rule 1 "makes crystal clear
the obligation of judges-and lawyers-to cooperate and control the expense of litigation." 20 The court warned the parties that it took the 2015
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure seriously and expected them to do the same. 2 1
In Freedman v. Suntrust Banks, Inc.,22 the court was explicit that it
expects parties to share information about their electronic information
11. 2016 WL 7031326, at *4.
12. Id. The offer to produce metadata only for specific documents upon a showing of
need is a defensible compromise position for a party seeking to avoid producing metadata
for all documents in its production. Rarely will all metadata for all documents produced be
relevant to a case, and the additional burden of reviewing all of the metadata for relevance
and privilege can be significant.
13. Id. at *1.
14. No. 15-cv-81222-MARRAIMATTHEWMAN, 2016 WL 4618931 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 2,
2016), overruled on other grounds by Blake v. Batmasian, No. 15-81222-CIV-MARRA/
MATTHEWMAN, 2017 WL 657767 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 15, 2017).
15. 29 U.S.C. ch. 8 (2012 & Supp. II 2015).
16. 2016 WL 4618931, at *2.
17. Id.
18. FED. R. CIV. P. 26.
19. Batmasian, 2016 WL 4618931, at *6, 7, 8, 10, 11.
20. Id. at *3.
21. Id.
22. No. 6:15-cv-1657-Orl-41TBS, 2016 WL 3196464 (M.D. Fla. June 9, 2016).
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systems early in cases to allow for efficient and economical discovery. 23
The plaintiff in Freedman was seeking to certify a class of credit applicants with disabilities, claiming the class had been discriminated against
by the defendant. 24 The plaintiff sought discovery of loan files of potential
class members but did not know the searching capabilities of the electronic information system the defendant used to store its loan files. 25 The
defendant objected to reviewing all of its loan files to identify potential
class members, claiming the process would be unduly burdensome. 26 The
parties wasted several months of discovery while the plaintiff tried to
figure out how to discover relevant information from the defendant's computers in a way that would be less burdensome for the defendant-apparently with little guidance from the defendant. 27 Although the court
chided the plaintiff for her general lack of diligence in moving the case
along, it reluctantly granted her motion to extend the deadline for class
certification to allow more time for discovery because it found she acted
"energetically," albeit ineffectively, in seeking discovery from the defendant's electronic information system. 28 The court encouraged parties to
communicate earlier about E-Discovery and to get E-Discovery experts
involved early if necessary to help parties learn about the capabilities of
relevant electronic information systems. 29 The court observed that "[a]
Rule 30(b)(6) deposition should not be necessary to obtain straightforward information about a party's electronic information systems."30
As these cases demonstrate, courts will look for, consider, and weigh
parties' efforts to cooperate when deciding discovery motions under the
Federal Rules as amended in 2015. The amendment to Rule 1 may not
have officially created new obligations for parties, but, urged on by Chief
Justice Roberts, courts are increasingly looking to Rule 1 to guide them
in untangling E-Discovery disputes.
II. SCOPE OF DISCOVERY
One of the most talked about 2015 amendments was the overhaul of
Rule 26(b)(1) to reemphasize the role of proportionality in discovery. By
moving the proportionality factors from Rule 26(b)(2)(C) to Rule 26(b)(1),
the Rules Committee did not change the scope of discovery so much as it
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at *5.
Id. at *1.
Id. at *3.
Id.
See id. at *4-5.
Id. at *6.
Id. at *5 (discussing FED. R. CIv. P. 30(b)(6)).
Id.
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renewed the courts' and practitioners' focus on the use of the factors to
limit discovery. 31
An interesting, and perhaps unexpected, use of proportionality to limit
discovery presented itself in In re: Takata Airbag Products Liability Litigation.32 In that case, the parties disagreed over how to handle the production of irrelevant, confidential information that was comingled with
discoverable data. The producing party requested that it be allowed to
redact confidential, irrelevant information from documents containing
relevant data and that it be allowed to withhold irrelevant parent documents from responsive document families. 33 The requesting party opposed the redactions, arguing that the parties had a confidentiality order
in place to protect any commercially sensitive information contained in
the documents and warned that allowing such redactions would lead to
unnecessary litigation.34 Following the recommendation of the case's special master, the court allowed the producing party to redact confidential,
irrelevant information and to withhold irrelevant parent documents. 35
The court cited Rule 26(b)(1) proportionality and Chief Justice Roberts's
Year-End Report 36 for the proposition that "a party is not entitled to receive every piece of relevant information."37 "It is only logical, then," the
court held, "that a party is similarly not entitled to receive every piece of
irrelevant information in responsive documents if the producing party
has a persuasive reason for why such information should be withheld." 38
The fallout from the Takata decision bears watching. The court's ruling appears to devalue the protection afforded parties by confidentiality
agreements, and this decision could lay the foundation for an increase in
discovery disputes over redactions and the withholding of family documents in the name of relevancy.
III. FORM

OF PRODUCTION

Mitchell v. Reliable Security, LLC39 involved a dispute over the form
of production of ESI.40 The plaintiff asked the court to compel the defendant to produce documents in their native electronic format. According to

31. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (2010).
32. No. 15-2599-MD-MORENO, 2016 WL 1460143 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 1, 2016).
33. Id. at *1.
34. In re: Takata, 2016 WL 1460143, at *2.
35. Id.
36.

ANNuAL REPORTS, supra note 4, at 6.

37.
38.
39.
40.

In re: Takata, 2016 WL 1460143, at *2.
Id.
No. 1:15-cv-03814-AJB, 2016 WL 3093040 (N.D. Ga. May 24, 2016).
Id. at *1.
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the plaintiff, the emails and spreadsheets that would support her theory
of the case were "susceptible to post hoc manipulation," which, she
claimed, necessitated an examination of the documents' metadata. 4 1 The
defendant asked to be allowed to produce documents in PDF format,
claiming that the production of documents in native format would be
more expensive and was not justified given the small amount in controversy. Neither party produced any evidence to support its claims. Operating in an evidentiary vacuum, the court ruled in favor of the plaintiff
and compelled the defendant to produce ESI in native format. 42 The decisive factor in the plaintiffs favor was the defendant's failure to make
"an adequate showing that production of native files is cost prohibitive." 43
The court found no reason to believe the defendants' ESI had been tampered with but held that the plaintiffs wish to verify no tampering had
occurred was not unreasonable. 4
The court's decision to compel the production of ESI in native format
based on the mere potential for tampering is noteworthy. There are valid
objections to producing ESI in its native format that were not raised in
this case, however, which may limit Mitchell's precedential value.
IV. COST-SHIFTING

In United States ex rel., Victor E. Bibby, et al. v. Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A.,45 the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia considered whether the cost of document review could be shared with
an opposing party under Rule 26(c)(1).

46

The court previously entered a

protective order requiring the plaintiffs to pay half of the costs arising
from the discovery of certain defendant's mortgage loan files. When the
defendant filed a motion for payment pursuant to that protective order,
it included a demand for payment of half of the document review cost.
The plaintiffs objected to the demand for review costs, arguing that such
7
costs were excluded from the allocable expenses under Rule 26(c)(1).4

The court observed that the rule permitted courts to allocate expenses
in protective orders but provided no guidance as to what constitutes an
"expense."4 8 After considering the split of authority from other jurisdictions on the question, the court held that "under limited circumstances,

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
No. 1:06-CV-0547-AT, 2016 WL 7365195 (N.D. Ga. May 26, 2016).
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id.
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a party may seek to share reasonable costs related to reviewing documents prior to their production." 49 The court stressed that cost-sharing
was appropriate under the "special circumstances" of the case and recited
several factors the court weighed in its decision, including a discovery
time period covering more than a decade, the significant discovery costs
borne by the defendant that were not subject to the protective order's
cost-sharing provision, and the court's belief that the cost shifting would
not deter the plaintiffs or others from seeking to vindicate their rights.50
V. SPOLIATION

The courts' application of Rule 37(e),5 1 which governs spoliation of ESI,
was one of the most closely watched developments in E-Discovery in
2016. Four spoliation cases out of the Eleventh Circuit footprint garnered
national attention. 52
In Living Color Enterprises, Inc. v. New Era Aquaculture, Ltd.,53 the
plaintiff moved for sanctions against the defendant for knowingly deleting text messages relevant to the case. 54 The defendant admitted that the
text messages in question had once existed and that he had deleted
them.55 According to the defendant, he routinely deleted text messages,
and set his phone to automatically delete text messages after thirty days.
The defendant admitted that he forgot to turn the auto-delete function
off when the lawsuit began. In light of these facts, the plaintiff asked the
court to strike the defendants pleadings and enter default judgment in
plaintiffs favor.56
The court denied the plaintiffs motion for sanctions.5 7 Walking
through the steps of Rule 37(e) analysis, the court found (1) the spoliated
ESI should have been preserved, (2) at least some of the ESI that should

49. Id. at *2.
50. Id.
51. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(e).
52. Living Color Enterprises, Inc. v. New Era Aquaculture, Ltd., No. 14-cv-62216MARRAIMATTHEWMAN, 2016 WL 1105297 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 22, 2016); Keim v. ADF Midatlantic, LLC, No. 12-CV-80577-MARRA/MATTHEWMAN, 2016 WL 7048835 (S.D. Fla.
Dec. 5, 2016); O'Berry v. Turner, Nos. 7:15-CV-00064-HL, 7:15-CV-00075-HL, 2016 WL
1700403 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 27, 2016); Brown Jordan International, Inc. v. Carmicle, Nos. 0:14CV-60629-ROSENBERG/BRANNON, 0: 14-CV-61415-ROSENBERG/BRANNON, 2016 WL
815827 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 2, 2016).
53. No. 14-cv-62216-MARRA/MATTHEWMAN, 2016 WL 1105297 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 22,
2016).
54. Id. at *1.
55. Id. at *2.
56. Id.
57. Id. at *7.
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have been preserved was lost,5 8 and (3) the lost ESI could not be replaced
through additional discovery.59 All three of these questions having been
answered in the affirmative, the court next considered whether the plaintiff had been prejudiced by the loss of the ESI.60 The court found that the
plaintiff had not been prejudiced by the lost text messages because most
of the missing text messages had been recovered from a third party and
because the plaintiff failed to explain a direct nexus between the missing
messages and the allegations in the complaint. 61 Lastly, the court found
no direct evidence of "intent to deprive" or bad faith, observing that "it is
common practice amongst many cell phone users to delete text messages
as they are received or soon thereafter. There is nothing nefarious about
such a routine practice under the facts presented here." 62 Having found
no prejudice or intent to deprive, the court held that neither curative
measures nor sanctions could be imposed under Rule 37(e). 63
Keim v. ADF Midatlantic, LLC64 was a Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA)65 putative class action lawsuit in which the plaintiff
claimed he received unsolicited text messages from the defendants.6 6 The
defendants moved for sanctions when they discovered that the plaintiff
had failed to preserve text messages that the defendants claimed would
show his consent to the allegedly unsolicited text messages.67 As in Living Color Enterprises, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida walked through the steps of the Rule 37(e) spoliation
analysis.68 The court answered the first question of that analysis,
whether the lost ESI should have been preserved, in the negative.6 9 The
plaintiff exchanged the lost text messages between February and March
2011, and he testified that he routinely deleted his text messages shortly
after receiving them. The plaintiff also testified that he first anticipated
filing the lawsuit in or around October 2011.70 Finding no clear evidence

58. The harm from this factor was mitigated by the fact that the plaintiff had been able
to obtain many of the lost text messages from a third party. Id. at *5.
59. Id. at *4-5.
60. Id. at *5.
61. Id.
62. Id. at *6.
63. Id.
64. No. 12-CV-80577-MARRA/MATTHEWMAN, 2016 WL 7048835 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 5,
2016).
65. 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2012).
66. Keim, 2016 WL 7048835, at *1.
67. Id.
68. Id. at *4-6.
69. Id. at *5.
70. Id. at *4.
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on when the text messages were actually deleted, the court concluded
that the text messages were most likely deleted before the plaintiff had
a duty to preserve them, and thus, sanctions were not appropriate. 71
The most surprising spoliation case in 2016, O'Berry v. Turner,72 is an
auto accident case in which the plaintiffs' car was hit by a tractor-trailer
truck. 73 The plaintiffs' attorney sent a spoliation letter to the defendants'
counsel requesting that they preserve the relevant driver logs and information about the truck. The trucking company's loss control manager
testified that he printed the driver log and PeopleNet data relevant to
the action and placed the printed copies in a manila folder, which was his
standard practice in the event of an accident involving one of the company's trucks. The loss control manager stored the folder in a cabinet in
his office, but during the course of the litigation, the manager packed the
folder into a moving box in anticipation of moving his office to another
building and then took a medical leave of absence. When he returned, the
manager was unable to locate the folder containing the documents for
this case. When he reached out to PeopleNet to try to recover the missing
data, he was told that the data had already been deleted pursuant to
74
PeopleNet's document retention policy.

Applying Rule 37(e), the court found that the trucking company's practice of printing a copy of the missing ESI and putting it in a folder did not
constitute reasonable steps to preserve the missing data.7 5 The court then
turned to the issue of sanctions.76 The court held that the company's practice of printing a single copy of a document it had a duty to preserve was
irresponsible.7 7 The court concluded that the company's failure to preserve the documents went beyond negligence, stating, "Such irresponsible and shiftless behavior can only lead to one conclusion-that [the company] acted with the intent to deprive the Plaintiff of the use of this
information at trial."7 8 As a sanction, the court ordered that an adverse
jury instruction would be given, requiring the jury to presume that the
79
missing evidence was unfavorable to the defendants.

71.
72.
2016).
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
Nos. 7:15-CV-00064-HL, 7:15-CV-00075-HL, 2016 WL 1700403 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 27,
Id. at *1.
Id. at *1-2.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id. at *4.
Id.
Id. at *5.
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The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
in Brown Jordan International, Inc. v. Carmicle8 o also imposed an adverse inference as a sanction for spoliation under Rule 37(e). 81 In this
case, the defendant, after being terminated by his employer, used the
"Find my iPhone" app to remotely lock his company laptop and render it
useless. 82 He also remotely wiped his company-owned iPad and lost his
personal iPad after he knew litigation was imminent. 83
Analyzing the plaintiffs motion for sanctions under Rule 37(e), the
court concluded that the defendant had failed to take reasonable steps to
preserve ESI, resulting in the loss of relevant data. 84 The court also found
that the defendant acted with intent to deprive the plaintiff of information related to the litigation.8 5 The case was tried as a bench trial, and
the court elected to presume that the lost information was unfavorable
to the defendant as a sanction for spoliation.86
VI. CONCLUSION

As expected, the courts in the Eleventh Circuit grappled with a number of E-Discovery disputes in the first full year following the amendment
of the Federal Rules. The take-aways from Year One under the 2015
Amendments to the Federal Rules are: (1) courts are taking seriously the
commitment to cooperation; (2) the amendment to Rule 37(e) is not the
insurmountable barrier to case-killing sanctions that some hoped, and
some feared, it would be; and (3) the full impact of the proportionality
factors remains to be determined.

80. Nos. 0:14-CV-60629-ROSENBERG/BRANNON,
BRANNON, 2016 WL 815827 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 2, 2016).
81. Id. at *2.
82. Id. at *4.
83. Id. at *33.
84. Id. at *37.
85. Id.
86. Id.

0:14-CV-61415-ROSENBERG/

